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The history of the Canal del Dique dates back to the 16th century, when the region looked for a way to connect with the Magdalena River and thus establish an effective route of river trade. Since then, the Canal del Dique has become the commercial ally of the Colombian Caribbean region.

Around 400 years after the birth of the Canal del Dique, the National Government takes on the task of resuming these old commercial routes, promoting projects that aim to restore navigability and life to the Magdalena River, its tributaries and complementary waterways.

On June 23, 2020, the National Infrastructure Agency published the notice of invitation to prequalify for the granting of a concession under the Public Private Association in the terms of Law 1508 of 2012, that allows the selection of a Concessionaire that at its own risk and expense carried out the tasks of Design, Construction, Financing, Operation, Maintenance and Reversal of Assets to the Nation, for the “Restoration of degraded ecosystems of the Canal del Dam ”.

With this type of project, the national government seeks to meet one of the objectives proposed in the 2018-2022 Development Plan, consisting of mobilizing 30% more cargo through the rivers. Likewise, this project aims to promote alternative methods of transportation for both passengers and cargo, thus achieving socially, economically and environmentally sustainable cities and communities.

Those who are interested in participating in this prequalification must present a manifestation of interest in the terms and conditions provided by the National Infrastructure Agency – ANI -, no later than next December 16, 2020 , in the auditorium of the entity.

The key facts:

Requirements:

Who can participate? Natural or legal persons, national or foreign, individually or under plural structures.
Experience [1] in investment

  • Experience obtained under associative figures may be accredited provided that the interested party has had at least a twenty-five (25%) participation in the respective associative form at the time the financing took place. < / li>
  • Likewise, participants may prove experience of (i) their controlled companies (directly or indirectly), (ii) their parents, or (iii) companies controlled by their parents.
  • Financing of one (1) concession of an infrastructure project, whose financing value has been COP $ 588,853,000,000 / USD 156M.
  • Financing of up to four (4) Infrastructure Project Concessions (s) whose financing value in simple sum has been at least COP $ 785,138,000,000 / USD 208M USD, provided that at least one (1 ) of the financing has been at least COP $ 392,569,000,000 / 104M USD.
  • Not all contracts are required to be contributed by the same leader.
Financial Capacity Equity Excelencia2 minimum COP $ 981,422,000,000 / USD 260M.

In Plural Structures, the Net Assets of the Members of the same may be added, however, at least one of the Leaders must have a minimum Net Equity COP $ 392,569,000,000 / 104M USD. < / td>

Borrowing capacity

  • Indebtedness index: less than or equal to 90% if the individual protester or all the Members of the Plural Structure who are accrediting Financial Capacity are financial entities. In all other cases, the maximum Indebtedness Ratio will be 85%.
  • Firm credit quota: one (1) approval certification of firm Credit Quota for an amount not less than $ 490,711,000,000./130M USD.
Selection system
  • List of Prequalified who may participate as bidders in the selection process.
  • The list will be made up of at least two (2) protesters.
The dates to take into account:

The dates to take into account:

ACTIVITY PLACE DATE
Deadline for submitting comments on the Invitation Document SECOP October 20, 2020
Closing Hearing for presentation of Expressions of Interest ANI. Auditorium, 2nd floor December 16, 2020
Hearing for the conformation of the Prequalified List ANI February 26, 2021


At Gómez-Pinzón we have an expert team in advising national and international companies in public tenders, selection processes, administrative law and infrastructure.


[1] The experience will be calculated in constant pesos of December 2018

[2] Defined as the residual value of the total assets of the economic entity, after discounting the total liabilities.

The unfulfilled promises of the APP

By: María Alejandra Mora Hernández

The coronavirus (COVID-19) came to remind us of what the Public-Private Associations (APP) were supposed to do and have not been able to achieve, evidencing their promises
Unfulfilled:

Broken promise No. 1.
Law 1508 of 2012 was promulgated with the aim of linking the
private sector more actively in the development of both productive and social infrastructure.
However, under the PPP scheme, infrastructure has been strongly privileged
productive: of the 777 projects registered in the RUAPP for the fourth quarter of 2019, 32 correspond to the drinking water and basic sanitation sector and only 7 to the health sector, in contrast to, for example, 120 in the transport sector. In addition to this, of the total number of registered projects, 55.85% were unsuccessful, abandoned, rejected or declared void 1.
These figures are not very encouraging in relation to social PPPs as a solution to
medium-term for the deficit of social infrastructure, especially hospital, which has become one of the greatest challenges that the country faces in the fight against the pandemic.
For now, the Bogotá District seems to position itself as a laboratory for hospital PPPs with the first PPP (Hospital de Bosa) already awarded. Let’s hope that the pandemic gives a truce and that, for the next calamity that puts the country’s hospital system to the test, the APPs keep their appointment.
Apart from hospitals, COVID-19 has brought to the fore the lack of educational infrastructure and connectivity in the country. Given the lack of technological tools that students are faced with, the government has turned to radio and television to disseminate educational content.
Hopefully the experience of this confinement will serve not only to develop PPPs in these areas but also to completely rethink the scheme with universality as the main orientation. To do this, it will be necessary to incorporate criteria of connectivity and access to technology in PPPs in the education sector.
And the ñapa, leaving aside the prison crisis – dramatically famous during the pandemic – less evident to many, but equally essential: the justice sector. While most of us Colombians have had to adapt to new work patterns, the judicial branch is practically paralyzed.
8 years after the issuance of the General Process Code that promoted the
implementation of technological means in the processing of judicial processes in order to “facilitate and expedite access to justice, as well as expand its coverage” 2, COVID-19 revealed that the processing of judicial proceedings through messages from data is, unfortunately for a highly litigious country and with a system where justice is usually late, far from being a reality. At the moment, none of the projects registered in the RUAPP is aimed at the digitization of the judicial system: will any brave, public or private, dare to dream of making the General Code of Process a reality and digitizing justice?
Thus, it is clear that the deployment of social infrastructure from PPPs is incipient and that this mechanism has not fully achieved, until now, its objective of responding to the most urgent and direct needs of the communities for access to public services of quality.

1 Figures obtained from the RUAPP Quarterly Report for the fourth quarter of 2019. Bulletin 24 of the
National Planning Department.
2Article 103 of the C.G.P.

Broken promise No.2.
Undoubtedly, social PPPs would have improved the response capacity to COVID-19 at the territorial level, but for small local entities, which usually have the smallest budget and most urgent social needs in terms of public services, the low institutional capacity to structure and evaluate
projects is one of the main barriers to PPPs.
Even for the most institutionally robust entities, the APP approval process is tortuous and time consuming: out of 343 projects under evaluation, 222 exceeded their maximum legal evaluation term and only 10.8% have been awarded.
Faced with delays, some administrations prefer other execution mechanisms that offer greater flexibility in their structuring and allow the initiation of works more quickly, such as works contracts or traditional concessions governed by Law 80 of 1993. For example, the Peñalosa administration He opted for public works for the Usme and Santa Clara hospitals and for a traditional concession for the First Line of the Bogotá Metro and Mayor Claudia López has publicly said that Bogotá cannot waste time with the tortuous approval process of the PPPs.
In fact, today, the only social PPP at the territorial level that can be considered successful is that of the Coliseo el Campin and while some other project goes ahead, we will continue to hope that the PPPs offer an alternative for entities with less financial and institutional capacity and fulfill their promise. to bring greater social welfare to communities at the local level.
Broken promise No. 3.
They promised us that PPPs would result in efficient risk transfer. In practice, in private initiatives (IP), which account for 76.68% of the projects registered in the RUAPP, a total transfer of the risks is made to the private, situation
especially delicate in a situation such as the current one in relation to the management of the unpredictable and irresistible risk of acts of authority and public health. If to this is added the lower return offered by social PPPs and the underestimation of the risks assumed by public entities, the disinterest of the private sector is almost guaranteed.
Perhaps it is time to re-evaluate some rules that, in practice, lead to the failure of IPs, such as the limitation of public resources or the rules of addition and extension. In the case of IPs that require disbursement of public resources, Law 1508 of 2012 limits public resources to 30% of the value of the estimated investment budget (20% in the case of road concessions), while additions and extensions ( that must be quantified) cannot exceed 20% of the original value of the planned public resources.
On the other hand, for private initiatives without public resources, additions that imply the disbursement of public funds are prohibited, extensions limited to 20% of the initial term and any type of recognition, compensation or remuneration of the investment by the entity state is out.
Perhaps if the law had not included these restrictions and had allowed the parties to the PPP contract to make an adequate distribution of risks taking into account the public interest and the particularities of each project, another would be the history of the IPs (such as the de Cesar Guajira) and social PPPs, which would perhaps be more popular with the private sector.
Broken promise No. 4.
The PPPs promised security for the investor. Apart from the legislative volatility of the country, the rigid contractual interpretation of the entities and the indecision
of public officials (originated in the fear of control bodies -the
called ías-) delays the execution of projects and undermines the certainty retained. This hinders both the execution and the financing of projects and, in some cases, such as Ruta del Sol, results in decisions that are not clearly privileged in the public interest, understood as the timely provision and quality of services provided by the infrastructure. concession was called to lend.
At this point, it must be admitted that the fifth generation of road concessions (5G), by trying to solve several of the problems of interpretation of 4G, is a good sign for the market, especially in times of pandemic. Even better in that it includes the environmental sustainability of the projects, in line with the country’s international commitments and the demands of foreign investors and financiers on the matter.
Notwithstanding the good news of 5G, COVID-19 impacts the execution and financial balance of all projects and therefore, the institutional response must give a clear, forceful message aimed at guaranteeing that security promised both to developers of projects and funders.
Let’s hope that the institutional response to the effects of the crisis does not deepen the unfulfilled promises of PPPs any further and, on the contrary, bring them closer to their objectives.
For now, it only remains to wonder if COVID-19 will be of sufficient magnitude not to simply be the bell that warns of non-compliance but to become the starting point to rethink the regime of public-private partnerships in such a way that social PPPs , with all their promises, be an engine for the economic recovery of the country and a reality at all levels of administration.